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Liability Insurer Data as a Window  
on Lawyers’ Professional Liability 
Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff* 
Using the best publicly available data on lawyers’ liability claims 
and insurance—from the largest insurer of large law firms in the United 
States, the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on 
Professional Liability, and a summary of large claims from a leading 
insurance broker—this Article reports the frequency of lawyers’ liability 
claims, the distribution and cost of claims by type of practice, the 
disposition of claims, and lawyers’ liability insurance premiums from the 
early 1980s to 2013. Notable findings include remarkable stability over 
thirty years in the distribution of claims by area of practice among both 
small and large firms, a large percentage of claims (64–70%) involving de 
minimis expenses (less than $1000) in the small firm market, and in the 
large firm market a declining rate of “real claims” per one thousand 
lawyers, a declining rate of real average gross loss per claim, and stable real 
premiums per lawyer since the early 1990s. Because of data limitations, 
however, these results cannot be confidently generalized. Further advances 
in the understanding of lawyers’ liability and insurance will require 
qualitative research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers’ liability is a remarkably underexplored topic in tort and insurance 
law teaching and scholarship. Products liability, medical malpractice, 
environmental liability, and even the ubiquitous but hardly highbrow topics of 
auto liability and workers compensation fill the pages of tort and insurance law 
casebooks and law reviews. 
Not so for lawyers’ liability, the liability that arises out of a breach of lawyers’ 
professional obligations to their clients. This is the liability risk that might be 
thought to be the most real, and the liability insurance most relevant, for the 
future lawyers who are our students. Yet law schools and legal scholarship scarcely 
touch on lawyers’ liability, and they do so almost exclusively through the lens of 
professional responsibility teaching and scholarship, where it receives decidedly 
different treatment than it would in a torts and insurance context.1 Among other 
differences, liability insurance is almost never mentioned in professional 
responsibility casebooks, and discussions of lawyers’ liability typically appear only 
in a short section on lawyer competence.2 
This situation may be about to change because law-and-society scholars have 
turned their attention to lawyers’ liability.3 In typical law-and-society fashion, this 
research will focus more on the law in action than the law on the books. Liability 
law in action almost always intersects with liability insurance, even when that 
intersection comes in the form of the absence of, or gaps in, liability insurance.4 
While there certainly are gaps, especially for solo practitioners and the smallest law 
 
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 
701–47 (8th ed. 2009); THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 64–78 (10th ed. 2008); DEBORAH L. RHODE & 
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 1007–20 (5th ed. 2009) (section on competence and malpractice). But 
see TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 454–68 
(3d ed. 2013) (using lawyer professional liability (LPL) insurance cases to teach about late notice 
problems in claims made policies); SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION (2d ed. 2015). 
2. One professional responsibility casebook that does contain a brief section on lawyers’ 
liability insurance is GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 881–
84 (5th ed. 2010). 
3. In addition to our project, we are aware of upcoming projects on lawyers’ liability insurance 
by Bert Kritzer, Neal Vidmar, and Leslie Levin. Kritzer organized a significant gathering of law and 
society legal malpractice researchers that took place at the International Institute for the Sociology of 
Law in Onati, Spain in the summer of 2015. 
4. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY 1 (2009) (“The tort system, not 
only as it exists on paper but also how it works in practice, is a product of the insurance system, just 
as the insurance system is a product of the tort system.”); Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort 
Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 7 (2005) 
(“Exclusions in liability insurance policies create, in effect, remote islands of tort liability that lawyers 
and law professors know about, but almost no one goes to visit.”). 
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firms, firms with more than a few lawyers generally have liability insurance.5 Thus, 
liability insurance data have the potential to provide a window on lawyers’ liability, 
at least to the extent that the data are publicly available. 
This Article contributes most significantly to this developing understanding 
of lawyer’s liability by compiling and analyzing the data that are publicly available. 
Each of the three sources we examine is limited in significant ways, but taken 
together, they provide a window on claims brought against lawyers for breaches of 
their professional duties. These data also add a useful complement to, and 
highlight the need for, our ongoing qualitative research on lawyers’ professional 
liability (LPL) insurance. 
In this Article we present data compiled from the annual reports of the 
Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society insurer, commonly referred to as ALAS, 
which is the insurer with the largest market share in the medium- to large-firm 
LPL insurance market. Using the ALAS data, we are able to track LPL insurance 
pricing and claims for ALAS members from 1983 to the present. 
The ALAS data are especially well suited for tracking insurance prices over 
time, because ALAS engages in unitary pricing, meaning that it charges the same 
per lawyer price for each of the policies that it offers, regardless of any differences 
among member firms.6 All of the policies offered each year are identical in every 
respect except the limits of liability and the self-insured retention (SIR), which is 
the amount of money the firm must spend on a claim before ALAS begins to pay. 
While ALAS has changed the mix of policies that it has offered over time (for 
example, by offering policies with higher limits and SIRs in more recent years), 
there are a number of SIR/policy limit combinations that have been continuously 
offered, allowing us to track the price of LPL insurance in the medium- to large-
firm market for over thirty years. What we find is that, although LPL insurance 
pricing reflects the liability insurance underwriting cycle,7 meaning that substantial 
variations in prices over time are to be expected, LPL insurance premiums have 
declined in real terms since their peak in the early 1990s. 
The ALAS annual reports also contain claim-related information in a manner 
that is sufficiently consistent to permit comparison over time. ALAS reports the 
total number of what it calls the “real claims” reported by members per calendar 
year (defined as “all claims other that those initially classified as without merit”),8 
the number of real claims reported per one thousand lawyers per year, the number 
 
5. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 881–82. 
6. See, e.g., ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT] (showing the pricing matrix for any given retention and 
policy limit regardless of the firm risk). For some years ALAS charged California member firms a 
different price and for many years ALAS offered some policies with high self-insured retentions only 
to larger firms. See, e.g., ATTORNEY’S LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 16 
(1990) (noting ALAS’s hope to eliminate the twenty percent differential in California rates and the 
greater than 250-member policy). 
7. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 
393 (2005). 
8. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11. 
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of claims reported per calendar year by area of practice, and the gross incurred 
loss per calendar year by area of practice. What we find is that the rate of real 
claims per one thousand lawyers has also declined since a peak in the 1990s. 
Among our other findings, the most notable may relate to the relationship 
between litigation and transactional practice area claims. Although the litigation 
practice area produces the largest number of claims (about 40% of the total), the 
bulk of the losses in dollar terms are attributable to transactional practice, most 
significantly general corporate work, followed by banking and securities. 
While ALAS members are not representative of law firms generally, ALAS 
competes in the larger LPL market to retain and attract members, and law firms 
do join and leave ALAS over time. As a result, the prevailing belief among 
participants in the LPL insurance market is that ALAS’s overall pricing and claims 
experience is sufficiently similar to that of the firms that are eligible for 
membership that the ALAS experience provides a reasonably good window on the 
experience of that larger group of firms.9 We concur that the data are useful in 
relation to the experience of firms that are similar to those that are ALAS 
members, but that there are significant sectors of the bar that are under-
represented, most significantly large law firms based in New York City, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles and the very large, truly international firms. 
Although small law firms are entirely absent from the ALAS data, that 
absence is of less concern because the American Bar Association’s Standing 
Committee on Professional Liability has conducted a series of studies using claims 
data from liability insurers that sell primarily to solo and small firms. We conduct 
new analyses of these data and present them in some new ways as a complement 
to our analyses of the previously unreported ALAS data. 
Like the ALAS data, the ABA Standing Committee data have serious 
limitations. For present purposes, the most significant is that data drawn from 
liability insurance records can only reflect the experience of lawyers who buy 
professional liability insurance. Many lawyers, especially solo practitioners, do not. 
With that understood, the Standing Committee data allow us to track the LPL 
claims experience over time along a variety of useful dimensions: the kinds of 
errors that produce claims, the distribution of claims by practice area, and the 
disposition of claims. What the Standing Committee data reveal is remarkable 
stability over nearly thirty years of liability insurance claims, from 1983 to 2011. 
Although the Standing Committee reports do not contain data on premiums, long 
term stability in claims activity is likely to be associated with long-term stability in 
premiums, recognizing that there can be very large short-term changes in 
premiums over the course of the underwriting cycle. 
We present our results as follows. We begin with a brief note on method that 
explains how we obtained the qualitative information that we use to supplement 
the quantitative data. We then provide a basic description of the LPL insurance 
market that informs our discussion of the generalizability of what can be learned 
 
9. See infra Section III.B. 
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from the Standing Committee and ALAS data. We then present those data and 
findings. We conclude with discussion of a report prepared by Aon, the insurance 
brokerage firm with the largest LPL market share, regarding the nature of the 
errors that are alleged to have produced the largest publicly reported LPL 
settlements and judgments. 
I. A NOTE ON METHOD 
In addition to reporting results from the data from ALAS and the ABA 
Standing Committee, this Article draws on our ongoing qualitative research on the 
lawyers’ liability and insurance field. This qualitative research uses methods that 
have become familiar to liability and insurance scholars from the work of the 
sociologists H. Laurence Ross, Richard Ericson, and Carol Heimer as well as prior 
work by Baker and coauthors.10 Whenever possible we provide citations to trade 
literature and other public source material, but much of our information comes 
from confidential, semistructured interviews with LPL market participants, along 
with follow-up e-mail and phone conversations and participant observation at 
lawyers’ liability and insurance conferences and programs. 
To date, the interviews have focused primarily on LPL insurance structure, 
pricing, and underwriting. We have interviewed fifty-one market participants: ten 
from insurance brokers; seventeen from LPL insurers (two actuaries, ten 
underwriters, three C-suite executives, one claims executive, and one loss 
prevention specialist); fifteen from large law firms (twelve general counsels, one 
chair of an insurance committee, one chair of a risk management committee, and 
one chief financial officer); four reinsurance underwriters; two law firm lawyers 
who are paid by LPL insurers to provide risk management advice to other law 
firms; and three lawyers from outside law firms who serve as “monitoring 
counsel” for LPL insurers, coordinating claims management and insurance 
coverage communications between policyholders and insurers. 
Because we promised confidentiality to our participants, we will not provide 
information that would make them or their companies identifiable. When we do 
mention specific organizations, we use either public sources or statements from 
participants who have never worked in those organizations. 
II. THE LPL INSURANCE MARKET 
In this Part we provide an introduction to the LPL insurance market that will 
inform our discussion of the generalizability of our analyses of the ABA Standing 
Committee and ALAS data. In summary, the ABA Standing Committee data 
appear to be based upon a sufficiently large proportion of the solo and small firm 
 
10. See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (2010); 
RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (2004); H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970); Tom Baker 
& Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance and the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 
292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005); Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort 
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001). 
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market that the results of our analysis should be generalizable to insured solo and 
small firm lawyers. The ALAS data are likely to be similarly generalizable to the 
medium to large firms that are eligible for membership in ALAS, but not to 
important segments of the large firm market that are not well represented in 
ALAS: firms based in New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, and the 
truly international firms with a significant U.S. presence.11 
LPL insurers primarily segment the law firm market according to size and 
geography. While there are differences among insurers in where they draw lines 
between categories, the law firm size categories we identified are: solo 
practitioners, very small firms (five or fewer lawyers), small firms (five to thirty-
five lawyers), mid-sized firms (thirty-five to two hundred lawyers), large firms 
(two hundred or more lawyers), and mega international firms.12 For present 
purposes we draw our main line at thirty-five lawyers, the minimum size for 
becoming a member of ALAS. There are important subcategories on both sides of 
that line. We draw the line there, because when selling to a firm with fewer than 
thirty-five lawyers insurers sell LPL policies without significant, if any, 
individuation between insureds beyond the insureds’ areas of practice. As one 
Executive told us, below thirty-five lawyers “you have to underwrite by class in 
practice areas. There can’t really be any insight into an individual firm. You just 
 
11. ALAS insures only one of the eight firms described as “international” in the AmLaw 100 
(Mayer Brown), as compared to six of the twenty-two firms with more than a thousand lawyers 
( Jones Day, K&L Gates, Kirkland & Ellis, Mayer Brown, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, and Ropes & 
Gray). Compare Special Report, The AmLaw 100 2013, AM. LAW., May 2013, with 2013 ALAS ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 79–83. Eighteen of the AmLaw 100 are firms that are based in New York 
City. See Special Report, supra, at 141. Five of the AmLaw 100 are firms that are based in Palo Alto or 
Los Angeles. Id.  
12. See e.g., Telephone Interview with Broker 3 (Sept. 28, 2013); Telephone Interview with 
Broker 4 (Oct. 16, 2013). 
Broker 3: 
A lot of Bar Association programs or other insurers offering insurance to smaller law firms 
are typically in the solo attorney up to twenty-, twenty-five-, thirty-attorney range . . . . You 
talk to six people you’ll get, I don’t know, twelve to eighteen answers in terms of what 
middle market is. Middle market generally is 25 to 100, 25 to 150 attorneys. Some people 
would say it’s twenty-five to seventy-five attorneys . . . . Certainly those folks look to add 
attorneys, but they’re much different than when you get to the 175, 250-attorney firm on 
up. Then when you get to that next size there’s a large firm and then there’s the mega-firm 
or the international firm. In the middle of that some people will talk about regional firms 
where you’ll have some firms that are just gonna focus on the Southeast. They’re not too 
worried about Chicago or L.A. or wherever else. I don’t know if that’s helpful, but there’s 
not really one clear-cut way of anybody really defining firms. Even if you walk up and 
down our hallway and talk to people, some people would say, “Well midsized firms are 
100 to 250 attorneys.” Other people would say, “Well no it’s 25 to 100.” No real right or 
wrong answer when it comes to that. 
Telephone Interview with Broker 3, supra. 
Broker 4: 
I guess mostly the industry looks at firms on a size basis. Firms are still very much judged 
on the number of attorneys that they have. Everybody you speak to will have a different 
cut off as to what they consider a small firm, what they consider a mid-size firm, and what 
they consider a large firm. I guess from my perspective, I would consider a firm with less 
than fifty attorneys to be a small firm. With 50 attorneys to 200 attorneys, 250 attorneys, I 
would consider mid-size. Above 200, I think I would consider large. 
Telephone Interview with Broker 4, supra. 
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don’t have the time and you can’t afford it.”13 As a result, providing LPL 
insurance to firms that are larger than thirty-five lawyers is a significantly different 
business than providing LPL insurance to smaller firms. 
A. The Solo and Small-Firm LPL Market 
Close to three-quarters of lawyers in private practice in the United States 
work in firms that employ fewer than twenty attorneys and nearly half of those 
work in solo practice.14 The solo and small firm LPL insurance market is 
segmented by geography, primarily as a result of the state-based nature of 
insurance regulation and law practice. Each state bar association has its own bar-
approved program, and insurers active in the small firm market evaluate on a 
state-by-state basis whether to enter into the competition to be the bar-approved 
program, or whether to compete against that program in the market. Insurers file 
rates and report their results on a state-by-state basis, which further encourages 
them to conceptualize LPL markets on that basis. 
Lawyers in the small firm market appear to purchase policies with fairly low 
coverage limits. One insurer reported that its “average limit is somewhere in the 
$1.5 or $2 million range.”15 Another reported that most of its small firm insureds 
were in the “$1 million, $3 million, $5 million” range.16 
Even with low limits and correspondingly low prices, insurance may not be 
an integral part of every small firm and solo firm practice.17 While liability 
 
13. Telephone Interview with Executive 1 (Aug. 16, 2013). The full quote from Executive 1 in 
context is below: 
You’ll hear different formulations, but quite simply, the sort of thirty-five and up is still 
a—and that I believe is still ALAS’s level. Below thirty-five . . . you have to underwrite by 
class in practice areas. There can’t really be any insight into an individual firm. You just 
don’t have the time and you can’t afford it. I would say that there’s probably tranches 
within that world, and the most significant, interestingly, is probably between 35 and 200 
lawyers. You’re really thinking about what most people would still call a midsized law firm. 
They’re typically going to be—they might be in multiple locations, but they’re not going to 
be huge and international. There are, by the way, going to be exceptions, like Wachtell 
Lipton to this, but I’ll leave them aside, but most firms, until they crack 200, don’t have 
some of the problems that you would equate with a Davis Polk or a White & Case or a 
Covington & Burling. At 200 and up is a class unto itself. Then there’s a point at which—
and the number of attorneys becomes less important—then you get up till then you get to 
a point where you start talking about international mega firms. Increasingly, they are now 
combinations of UK and US firms, or they just built up their own international practices 
to the extent that it’s hard to tell where the center of gravity is. 
Id. 
14. Based on the most recent data obtained by the ABA, 75% of lawyers work in private practice.  
See CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN 2005 (Am. Bar Found. 2005) tbl.II.B, at 9, tbl.II.C., at 10. Of those, 73.9% work in firms 
employing fewer than 20 lawyers—48.6% work in solo firms, 13.5% work in firms with two to five lawyers, 
6.3% work in firms with six to ten lawyers, and 5.5% work in firms with eleven to twenty lawyers. See id. 
tbl.II.C, at 10. Given recent trends in large firm hiring, these numbers may, in fact, understate the number of 
lawyers working in small firms. 
15. Telephone Interview with CEO 1 (Nov. 16, 2013). 
16. Telephone Interview with Underwriter 2 (Oct. 15, 2013). 
17. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 881–82 (“[I]t is estimated that at least fifty percent of 
solo and small-firm lawyers have no liability insurance.”). 
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insurance is a de facto cost of business for large firms, solo attorneys and very 
small firms have to make difficult choices about coverage in a marketplace with 
thin margins.18 Even with fairly low rates for coverage, some firms may choose to 
go bare. As one insurance executive explained: 
[W]hen confronted with the prospect of just having to pay an additional 
$250.00 [for $200,000 of coverage per claim,] a lot of lawyers won’t do it . 
. . . [T]hat’s how thin their margins are from an operating standpoint. 
Yeah, you can get it very inexpensively and again, depending upon the 
economic times and what’s going on in the industry, even that can be too 
much. We don’t lose those insureds to a competitor. We lose them to 
going bare.19 
In other words, insurers selling insurance to solo practitioners and very small 
firms face price-sensitive clients who want to pay low premiums or none at all. 
Among other consequences, the large numbers of uninsured solo and very small 
firm lawyers means that statistics drawn from LPL insurers present an incomplete, 
and almost certainly biased, picture of lawyers professional liability. Lawyers and 
firms that choose to forego LPL insurance likely differ from other lawyers and 
firms in other ways as well. It is not difficult to imagine ways that those 
differences might affect the liability risks faced by these lawyers and firms. 
There are two main types of insurers active in the small firm LPL market: 
the NABRICO (National Association of Bar Related Insurance Companies) 
companies and commercial insurance companies like CNA and Travelers (in 
addition to the reinsurers that support both types of companies). The commercial 
insurers operate their small-firm business as part of what they call “program” 
business. These programs are fairly described as “cookie cutter,” with “the same 
wording for every firm,” the “same basic rate [plan],” and much smaller limits 
than large firms.20 NABRICO is a network of mutual insurers and risk-retention 
groups dating to the mid 1970’s liability insurance crisis that also spawned the 
“bedpan mutuals” active in the medical liability insurance market.21 As a result of 
the price-sensitive clients and cookie-cutter policies, it is not surprising to find 
that these insurance relationships look more like auto insurance relationships than 
like the relationships between large-firm LPL insurers and their clients.22 Lawyers 
buy a policy off-the-shelf and hope the insurer pays if a claim arises. Insurers do 
little in terms of underwriting, contract negotiation, tailoring loss prevention 
advice, or pricing based on particular risk management practices. 
 
18. Although one state requires all lawyers to carry malpractice insurance and other states 
require it for those who practice as part of limited liability organizations, most states do not require 
coverage. See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers 
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1438 (2013). 
19. Telephone Interview with CEO 1, supra note 15; see also Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 
1 (Oct. 26, 2013) (calling the decision to go bare “arrogant” and explaining, “You’ve got a personal asset 
base that—I don’t know, at the time was probably a million bucks—and you’re exposing it to one 
mistake that you can easily hedge your bet against by spending $3,000”). 
20. Telephone Interview with Underwriter 4 (Oct. 30, 2013). 
21. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 127. 
22. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 18, at 1446. 
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Most of the NABRICO companies have contributed data to all of the ABA 
Standing Committee studies, and many of the commercial insurance companies 
active in the small firm market have contributed data to one or more of the ABA 
Standing Committee studies.23 Thus, in light of the relative stability of the results 
of the Standing Committee studies that we will present, we conclude that those 
studies provide a reasonably good window on the claims experience of insured 
lawyers in solo and small firm practice over the last thirty years, with the 
recognition that a few of the insurers that participate in the Standing Committee 
studies—most significantly CNA—also sell insurance to large law firms. The 
Standing Committee studies do not indicate whether CNA and the other 
participating insurers that sell to both small and large firms included their large 
firm results in the data that they provided. Because of the predominance of solo- 
and small-firm lawyers in this pool, the inclusion of some large law firms is 
unlikely to affect most of the results that we present. We will indicate those results 
for which the potential inclusion of claims against large firms may make a 
difference. 
B. The Medium- to Large-Firm LPL Market 
There are three distinct types of insurance arrangements in the medium- to 
large-law-firm LPL insurance market, each with significantly different approaches 
to program structure and pricing: (1) ALAS, (2) three other medium- to large-law-
firm mutual insurance arrangements, and (3) the commercial insurance market. All 
three differ significantly from the small firm market in both insurance program 
structure and pricing. Larger law firms purchase much higher insurance limits 
than small firms, working closely with brokers (unless they are purchasing 
insurance exclusively from ALAS), and including more insurers on the risk. 
 
23. The report of the initial 1985 ABA study reports that all of the NABRICO companies 
participated and that of the commercial carriers active in the market, only three companies failed to 
contribute meaningful data. WILLIAM H. GATES & SHEREE L. SWETIN, AM. BAR. ASS’N, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
DATA CENTER, at vii–viii (1989) (identifying the three companies as American Home, The Home 
Insurance Company, and Shand Morahan). The ABA studies from 1996 forward specifically list the 
contributing insurers. A comparison of those lists with the membership list on the NABRICO 
website reveals that only the Texas Lawyers Insurance Company has never contributed data to the 
follow-up studies. The Florida Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company missed one study (2003); the 
Illinois State Bar Association Mutual Insurance Company contributed only to the 2007 and 2011 
studies; the Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company (California) missed the 1999 and 2003 studies; the 
Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company of Kentucky and the Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company of 
North Carolina each missed only the 2011 study; the Ohio Bar Liability Insurance Company missed 
the 1999 study; and the Oklahoma Attorneys Mutual Insurance Company missed the 2007 study. The 
other NABRICO members contributed data to all of the follow-up studies. There is much more 
variation in the commercial insurers contributing to the follow up studies. CNA is the only company 
that contributed to all the studies. Zurich contributed to all except the 1999 study. St. Paul 
(subsequently acquired by Travelers) contributed to all except the 1996 study. The other commercial 
insurers participating are a changing mix. Interestingly, ALAS contributed data to the 1996 study but 
to none of the other studies. 
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1. The Commercial Market 
The commercial market is dominated by a relatively small number of carriers, 
each of which is typically willing at the time of this writing to provide no more 
than $10 million of aggregate coverage to any given law firm in any given year.24 
Large law firms typically purchase limits vastly beyond what a single carrier wants 
to (or can) provide. The largest firms may seek insurance programs with total 
limits of up to $300 or even $400 million; mid-sized firms typically do not 
purchase as much insurance, but still may request limits beyond what any single 
carrier will offer.25 
Commercial large law firm insurance arrangements typically consist of layers 
of “quota share” insurance policies, collectively referred to as a “syndicate.”26 In a 
quota share, a lead insurer and two or more additional insurers provide up to $50 
million coverage (currently composed of no more than $10 million from any 
single insurer). Under this arrangement, each insurer in the syndicate is responsible 
for paying any losses according to a preset percentage. For example, if there are 
 
24. Telephone Interview with Broker 2 (Sept. 24, 2013): 
Most insurers will only—on large law firms or at any law firm, they’ll write $10 million 
part of a larger program. There’s a few insurers—there’s a few global insurers that will 
write $20 to $35 million. Rarely do they do that, but they have the ability to do that. 
25. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter 1 (Sept. 27, 2013) (“There are quite a few firms 
who have $200–300 millions in limits, but most of them a hundred or under.”). One insurance 
executive claimed that the top of the AmLaw 250 “buy 300 million in limits,” but “except for the very 
top handful, everyone [else in the AmLaw 250] is under 100 million.” Telephone Interview with 
Executive 2 (Oct. 31, 2013). 
26. Telephone Interview with Broker 6 (Dec. 6, 2013): 
R: Larger firms, sophisticated firms, prefer the syndicated placement, meaning you take 
capacity from various insurers and you put them together. You’re basically stretching the 
capacity so that, when you’ve got a claim, you’ve got the ability to have a comfortable 
primary. The people you’re dealing with when you pay the loss experience are the same 
people you’re dealing with when you’re paying the defense cost. They would rather have 
the capacity stretched a little bit differently. If somebody has a business plan that changes, 
they move off risk, and you just replace them. It’s not like you’re changing, wholesale 
changing a relationship. These insurers that I mentioned, some of them will write pure, 
discreet blocks of capacity, say ten million, or they’ll offer it on a syndicated basis. 
Q: Is syndicated the same as quota share? 
R: Yeah, exactly, quota share. 
Telephone Interview with Executive 2, supra note 25: 
Almost all our policies are quota share. There are carriers out there . . . [who] would write a 
primary ten million-dollar policy. If we offered you a ten million-dollar policy, we would 
take fifty percent of it, five million, and then we would quota share with another carrier. 
We are more comfortable with very large firms, and large firms take twenty-five, fifty 
million in limits for their primary limits. Then we take a piece of those limits. The most 
we’ll put on any primary is ten million. That’s not the first ten, that’s ten part of twenty-
five, or ten part of thirty-five. That’s how we quota share our business. 
Telephone Interview with Underwriter 1, supra note 25: 
[Towers are] built either in primary fifties or primary thirties, and they’re all quota share. 
Q: Oh, that’s interesting, so the primary layer is quota share? 
R: The whole program is often quota share. Most of those large programs will have a 
starting primary limit that’s relatively large that will be shared by three, four, five carriers. 
Then the first excess layer will be frequently another layer of—you may have a [primary 
of] fifty and excess fifty, again, shared by five, six, seven, eight carriers. What that’s 
allowed people to do is, aside from there all the excess players, it allows me to do—if I 
really like the firm, I’ll put up my whole ten on the primary, but I can also put five up on 
the primary and five up on the excess. 
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five insurers who have each contributed $10 million of coverage in a $50 million 
quota share and the insured suffers a $25 million loss, each insurer would pay $5 
million.27 This stands in contrast to a tower with layers of coverage sold by 
individual insurance companies, each of which pays only once the underlying 
insurance is exhausted. The lead insurer in the syndicate is responsible for setting 
the price, agreeing on the policy form, and managing the claim.28 To get to $300 
million or so of coverage, law firms must assemble multiple layers of insurers 
sharing a quota share risk in each layer. Typical of the large commercial insurance 
market more broadly, premiums for large law firm commercial insurance 
arrangements are individually negotiated and explicitly risk rated.29 
Assembling the tower can be difficult and time consuming. Thus, brokers 
are key actors in the large-firm commercial LPL insurance market, assembling a 
number of carriers to meet the needs of the insured. Even for firms with relatively 
small towers, the LPL business requires specialized expertise and long-term 
relationships.30 Brokers have traditionally had a comparative advantage in building 
and maintaining those relationships. 
 
27. Telephone Interview with Broker 4, supra note 12: 
Generally speaking, if you quota share you spread your risk in a more favorable way. 
Here’s the simplistic model. If a firm is buying ten million dollars, and that ten million 
dollars is provided by one insurer, if that firm has a three million-dollar claim, that insurer 
pays all those three million dollars. If that ten million is provided on a quota share basis by 
three different carriers, which equal shares of the ten million, and there’s a three-million 
dollar loss, they only pay a million. They pay a third of the three. 
28. Telephone Interview with Executive 3 (Dec. 20, 2013): 
Q: So do carriers set their rates for being a part of that quota share independently, or do 
they all sort of get together and decide, or one person decides and they all follow? 
R: Yeah, one person decides, so the broker will determine upfront. They’ll approach 
somebody and ask for a lead indication, and say, “What would you, how much capacity 
would you put out, and what would your quote be, and what would the terms be for this 
policy?” If they get a quote back from a person that they want to have the lead, and if they 
think that that’s acceptable to them and acceptable to their client, and then sellable to the 
rest of the market, something that they can get supported, they’ll take those terms and then 
they’ll come to the rest of the market. They’ll say, “Okay, here’s what CNA’s terms are on 
this firm, can you support those, and we’re looking for you to put up seven and a half 
million dollars of capacity or five or ten million,” whatever they’re looking for from us. At 
that point, my thing is either yes or no. Now, if they’ve placed forty million dollars and 
they need just ten million dollars plugged, my answer is basically yes or no because they 
can probably plug the last ten if they’ve got eighty percent of it placed already. If they 
come to me second, like, CNA put out a quote, here’s what the quote is, can you support 
that. If I come back and say, “Yeah, I’m sorry, I just can’t. I can’t get to that price.” If I’m 
just the second guy they’ve come to, they’ll likely come back to me and say, “Okay, what 
could you support?” All right, look, I can’t do it for a million one. I’m really at a million 
two fifty, and here’s why I think it needs to be at that rate blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. Or, I 
don’t like the retention treatment; I think the retention needs to move higher. Then, they’ll 
normally try to go back to the lead, and say, “Look, here’s where we need this to be. This is 
what we think we can get supported,” so they’ll bump the rates up, and then they’ll go to 
the third guy and the fourth guy. 
29. See id. 
30. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19: 
If [a law firm is] building up a tower of primary or first layer insurance and excess 
insurance, a broker is helpful because one, he has access to the markets. Secondly, it’s a 
whole lot of work for a law firm risk manager or someone to be doing themselves. They’re 
better off renting that through the commissions they pay to a broker. 
As one underwriter explained, 
[A] broker can help or hurt considerably in the sense of helping the law firm prepare the 
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2. ALAS 
ALAS differs from commercial insurers in four key ways. First, ALAS offers 
its member firms per-claim and aggregate LPL limits up to $75 and $150 million,31 
substantially more than the $10 million aggregate LPL limit that any commercial 
insurer will provide to a single law firm as of 2014. This means that ALAS 
members need to go to the commercial liability insurance market only for the kind 
of high-level excess insurance policies that very rarely are called upon to pay 
claims. As reported in more detail below, there are only sixty-four publicly known 
LPL verdicts and settlements in excess of $20 million. Of those, only twenty-eight 
are $35 million or more.32 Assuming, very conservatively, that defense costs are 
equal to settlement or verdict amounts even for very large claims (more likely, 
defense costs gradually become a smaller percentage of the total loss as the 
settlement amount rises), that means that only twenty-eight known LPL claims 
would have exceeded the LPL limits that ALAS makes available to its members. 
Second, ALAS historically refused to allow law firms in New York City to 
join, and it was reluctant to include law firms based in California.33 As a result, 
firms in New York City and California formed their own mutual insurance 
organizations, described next. While ALAS appears to have significantly relaxed 
these restrictions, the law firms participating in these other mutual insurance 
arrangements have largely stayed put. As a result, the ALAS experience may not 
reflect that of the large New York and California firms. 
Third, ALAS requires its members to engage in a variety of risk management 
activities and allow ALAS to manage all claims.34 Some commercial insurers 
encourage firms to engage in risk management activities, including in some cases 
by subsidizing the associated costs, but the activities are not a requirement.35 
 
submission—the presentation to us, in terms of the application. They can also help in the 
sense of the meeting to organize in such event that would help show the law firms 
advantages and prepare them, if there’s any weak spots, to know how to respond. 
Telephone Interview with Underwriter 4, supra note 20. 
31. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6. 
32. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
33. See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2001) (noting 
that ALAS bylaws were changed that year to remove geographic restrictions that had previously 
existed). 
34. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 17–20 (detailing ALAS’s loss 
prevention services and claim management requirements). 
35. One executive described the process for providing risk management advise to insureds: 
[W]hen we’re the lead carrier, we set up a budget. Probably, for a big firm that’s paying a 
million and a half or two million-dollars in premium, we’ll set up a twenty-five or thirty-
five or forty thousand-dollar risk management budget. Then what we’ll do is, we’ll talk to 
the firm periodically throughout the year. We’ll ask them different things about, are there 
issues that concern you? Do you feel comfortable with your conflicts? How do you feel 
about client intake? Have you gone through and done a review or audit of all your 
engagement letters? We’ll work with them to find out if they feel that this is something we 
really need more on. Cyber risk. I wonder if we’re really protected the way we should be 
from a cyber risk issue? Then we’ll go out, because there are plenty of vendors out there, 
and we will go out and we will hire somebody, or we’ll set up an engagement where 
someone will come in. A lot of times it’ll provide CLE, continuing legal education credit, 
so that helps the attorneys in the firm. We’ll give a presentation. 
2015] LIABILITY INSURER DATA AS A WINDOW 1285 
Commercial, large-law-firm LPL policies also almost always permit the law firm 
to select the defense lawyer, and they give the law firm significant control over the 
defense.36 
Fourth, ALAS charges unitary per-lawyer premiums that differ only 
according to the limit and retention of the policy.37 In other words, all ALAS 
member firms are eligible to purchase any combination of retention and limit for 
the same per-lawyer price regardless of the firms’ particular features or claims 
history.38 This means that ALAS members with the very best claims records are 
the firms that are most likely to realize lower premiums from leaving ALAS and 
entering the commercial market. 
It is important to note that ALAS member firms that wish to purchase 
additional insurance do so in the commercial market, using commercial insurance 
 
Telephone Interview with Executive 2, supra note 25. This is typical. Most insurers provide some risk 
management advice. One reinsurer told us that he did not give carriers a lower price for providing risk 
management services because he expected all carriers to do some level of risk management. 
“Everybody has a hotline; everybody probably offers various ancillary-type services and things even 
embedded into the policy, like you want mutual choice counsel, those types of things.” Telephone 
Interview with Reinsurer 2 (May 3, 2014). 
36.  See Telephone Interview with Broker 6, supra note 26: 
Most of the large firms will be on a surplus lines basis, and they’ll also be on an indemnity 
form basis. What they mean by indemnity is that, the duty to defend the firm does not rest 
with the insurer, but it rests with the insured. There’s more latitude in the way a case is 
defended in an indemnity form. 
As one broker stated: 
The smaller firms don’t tend to get the same breadth of coverage as the larger firms, and 
some of that is how claims are handled. The large firms in the U.S. have big self-insured 
retentions, and want to have a certain amount of autonomy as to how they handle their 
claims, and don’t want an insurer telling them how to do it. The smaller firms have much 
smaller self-insured retentions, and the insurers, as a result, insist on being much more 
heavily involved in the handling of the claim. You have policy wordings to reflect those 
two different types of way you do your business. 
Telephone Interview with Broker 9 (June 12, 2014). 
37. See 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6 (showing an example of the per-lawyer 
premium rates table ALAS charges). 
38. In the commercial market, for example, carriers commonly rate prices based on firm size, 
geography, practice area, and certainly claims history, among other things. See Telephone Interview 
with Executive 2, supra note 25 (listing “head counts, location, business split,” “practice area,” and 
“loss history” as the primary tools for building a premium price); see also Telephone Interview with 
Broker 3, supra note 12: 
Q: When you’re thinking about the rates for these firms what are the primary things you’re 
looking at? 
R: Head count. Lawyer’s professional liability is typically written on a head-count basis. A 
100-person firm is gonna pay a much different total premium than a 500-attorney 
firm. . . . There’s a lot of other pieces. The claims history is certainly important. The firm’s 
risk management policies and procedures. Geography sometimes plays a role. Certain 
jurisdictions insurers don’t like as much, so they’ll charge more. The areas of practice. 
Patent prosecution for example is a dangerous area cuz if somebody misses the filing of a 
patent at a certain date that could cause their client quite a bit of harm. Insurers would end 
up and have ended up paying quite a bit of money as compared to insurance defense work 
that usually comes at a lower risk. The areas of practice certainly are important. 
None of this, however, plays into ALAS’s pricing structure. While ALAS reserves the right to stop 
insuring its members with bad claims history, it does not do so frequently. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that since 1992, ALAS has declined to renew only 
twenty-one firms, including one in the fall of 2013). 
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brokers. These brokers can and do tell ALAS members what they would be 
charged for all of their LPL insurance if they left ALAS and went into the 
commercial market.39 This process brings the largest ALAS members into close 
contact with the commercial market at every renewal and, thus, tempers the 
degree to which ALAS pricing and other terms can be less favorable to law firms 
than those offered in the commercial market.40 Our senior broker respondents 
claimed that the savings could be as high as 30% for many of the ALAS member 
firms, though it is important to keep in mind that commercial insurers underwrite 
firms individually, and such predicted savings may prove to be exaggerated if a 
firm’s claims history or other factors suggest to underwriters that it is not as good 
a risk as a broker believes.41 
The regular contact between ALAS members and the commercial market 
reinforces our conclusion that it is reasonable to generalize the ALAS experience 
to much of the medium- to large-law-firm market, keeping in mind (1) the law 
firm sectors that are significantly underrepresented in ALAS and (2) the 
possibility that ALAS members have better claims records because of selection 
effects and ALAS loss prevention and claims management. 
3. Other Large-Firm Mutuals 
The third large law firm segment consists of three geographically based 
mutual insurance organizations about which very little is publicly known: Bar 
Assurance and Reinsurance, Ltd. (BAR), MPC Insurance, Ltd., and Attorneys 
Insurance Mutual Risk Retention Group (AIM). BAR serves very large New York 
City Firms. MPC members are primarily San Francisco-based very large law 
firms.42 AIM serves a broader based group of California law firms with more than 
 
39. When asked about whether his firm would consider leaving ALAS, one General Counsel 
of an ALAS firm joked, “that’s a frequently asked question . . . every commercial insurer in the 
western hemisphere—or actually more than the western hemisphere—is asking that question every 
year.” Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 3 (May 8, 2014). He later stated, “We are 
frequently approached by commercial carriers who would love to replace them if they could. It’s a 
common question; it’s a question that we’re asked and we consider every year.” Id. 
40. As a General Counsel of an ALAS law firm stated: 
We’re very satisfied with ALAS and I think it does a terrific job not only with respect to 
clients but with respect with loss prevention programs and so forth. We get approached 
from time to time by insurers or brokers who make pitches and so forth. We’re very 
comfortable with where we are and like I said it’s not that we don’t have significant 
interaction with the commercial markets outside of ALAS, because we have a substantial 
excess program and deal with and meet with those folks regularly. 
Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 5 (May 29, 2014). 
41. See, e.g., E-mail from Broker 8 to coauthor Tom Baker ( Jan. 4, 2015, 3:09 PM) (on file 
with coauthor Tom Baker). 
42. Brian McDonoguh, Jed Hurley, 30-Year McCutchen Attorney, 76, LEGALPAD ( July 9, 2009), 
http://legalpad.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/07/jed-hurley-30year-mccutchen-attorney-76.html 
[https://perma.cc/E8Z4-6L7J] (providing the obituary of Jed Hurley, thirty-year McCutchen 
Attorney, and identifying him as one of the founders of “MPC Insurance Ltd., a company that 
provided professional liability insurance to many of San Francisco’s largest law firms”); see Thomas J. 
Igoe, Jr., REED SMITH, http://www.reedsmith.com/thomas_igoe [https://perma.cc/RSV6-N8RZ] 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016) (identifying Mr. Igoe as of counsel to Reed Smith and President and 
Chairman of MPC Insurance, Ltd., and reporting that MPC is “a Vermont captive insurance company 
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forty-five attorneys.43 While there are substantial differences in the details of these 
three organizations, all three largely function as insurance buying groups and are 
managed by leading insurance brokers.44 More detailed description awaits future 
work. For present purposes it is useful to think of them as mutual/commercial 
hybrids that provide LPL insurance primarily for law firms that historically did not 
have access to ALAS. 
III. INSURER DATA ON LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
The lawyers’ liability that we are investigating and that is the subject of LPL 
insurance is legal malpractice liability: liability that arises out of a breach of the 
lawyers’ professional obligations to their clients. Lawyers can be sued for many 
other kinds of wrongs—from automobile accidents to employment 
discrimination—but those other kinds of liabilities are covered by other kinds of 
insurance, such as auto liability insurance, employment-practices liability 
insurance, and general liability insurance. 
In this Part we report at a high level what can be known about the frequency 
and extent of LPL claims based on the LPL insurer data that we have assembled. 
We have three sources: (1) a series of studies conducted by the American Bar 
Association Standing Committee on Lawyers’ Liability and previously published 
by the ABA; (2) the annual reports of the largest insurer of medium to large law 
firms, the Attorney’s Liability Assurance Society, which contain much useful data 
that has never been publicly  collected and analyzed and (3) a collection and 
analysis of the largest publicly reported LPL settlements and verdicts compiled by 
Aon, the insurance brokerage company with the largest market share in the 
lawyers professional liability insurance market. All of these sources have 
significant limitations. Nevertheless, taken together they provide an informative 
complement to what can be learned from qualitative research. 
A. The Standing Committee Studies 
The most significant prior empirical research on lawyers’ liability comes 
from the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers’ Liability. The Standing 
Committee launched its first systematic study of lawyers’ liability in response to 
the mid 1970’s liability insurance crisis (the same crisis that initiated the more 
 
owned by 9 national and international law firms that provides professional liability insurance coverage 
for more than 7,000 attorneys practicing in the United States and in many foreign jurisdictions”). 
43. See California Lawyer’s Annual Professional Liability Insurance Report, CAL. L., Feb. 2010, at 28, 
28–29. 
44. The Business Insurance directory of alternative risk financing facilities identifies Marsh as 
the manager for MPC. BI Directory of Alternative Risk Financing Facilities, BUS. INS. (Nov. 12, 2000, 12:01 
AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20001112/ISSUE01/10001657 
[https://perma.cc/UX2J-5RAN]. The California Lawyer listing of malpractice insurers identifies AIM 
as an “Aon affiliate.” Malpractice Insurance Report, CAL. L., Feb. 2006, at 32, 32–33. Aon also serves as a 
broker and manager for BAR. See E-mail from Executive 1 to both coauthors ( Jan. 5, 2015) (on file 
with coauthors) (confirming that Aon’s role managing BAR is widely known among LPL insurance 
professionals). 
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widely known empirical research on medical malpractice).45 Working closely with 
the members of NABRICO, the Standing Committee persuaded most of the 
insurers operating in the LPL market at the time to fill out individual reports on 
each claim opened or closed during a study period of 1980 to 1985, of which the 
29,227 claims reported during the period January 1983 through September 1985 
were deemed worthy of analysis.46 
Unfortunately, the study made no systematic effort to determine how 
representative this convenience sample was of lawyers and law firms, either by 
comparing the lawyers insured by these organizations to lawyers who did not 
purchase liability insurance at all or by comparing them to lawyers who are insured 
by organizations that did not participate.47 To the latter point, the nonparticipating 
insurance organizations include ALAS, other large law firm mutual insurance 
organizations, and a number of commercial carriers that insure medium and large 
firms. As a result, the data are skewed toward the solo- and small-firm market and 
are unlikely to be representative of claim practices in the medium- and large-firm 
market. 
Nonetheless, the first Standing Committee study had an impact on the LPL 
market. Imperfect as it was, it was the first effort to gather systematic evidence on 
lawyers’ liability and changed underwriting practices. A senior reinsurance 
underwriter who has been involved in the LPL market for more than thirty years 
described the study as producing “a paradigm shift in the thinking of the industry, 
from an earlier view of how to underwrite, to a more evidence-based type.”48 
Starting in 1996, the Standing Committee has updated this research in ten- 
and five-year increments, with the most recent study covering the years 2008 
through 2011.49 Unfortunately, the updates use a different research method than 
 
45. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 65 (2005) (describing the relationship 
between the liability insurance underwriting cycle and empirical research on medical malpractice). 
46. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE: A STATISTICAL STUDY OF DETERMINATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS 
ASSERTED AGAINST ATTORNEYS 3 (1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL 
STUDY]; GATES & SWETIN, supra note 23, at vii. 
47. A statistical study released prior to the 1989 publication reported that the Committee 
undertook the following validation exercise: 
Additionally, the major findings of this study were validated by examining claims from 
Oregon, with legal malpractice insurance mandatory for practice in a substantive 
proportion of all areas of law. [sic] Therefore, because the claims reported in Oregon come 
from a substantial group of the entire population of lawyers, the analysis of those claims 
should be generalizable to the lawyer population of Oregon. If the findings in this study 
hold true for Oregon, then they can be generalized more defensibly to the entire 
population of U.S. lawyers, even to those non-insured lawyers not included in this study. 
ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 5. This kind of statement does 
not appear in the 1989 report or in any of the follow up studies. See, e.g., GATES & SWETIN, supra note 
23. 
48. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19. 
49. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS IN THE 1990S (1996) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 1990S PROFILE]; AM. BAR 
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS 1996–1999 (2000) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999 PROFILE]; AM. BAR 
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
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the original study.50 The updates are based on calendar-year summary reporting by 
the participating insurers, based on their own internal records, rather than 
individual claim forms. To the extent that an insurer’s internal reporting does not 
match closely with the Standing Committee’s requested categorization, the 
reliability of the insurer’s reports is at issue.51 Moreover, because the LPL insurers 
providing the claims data have not remained consistent over the years, the results 
from the studies are not directly comparable. Lastly, just as in the original study, 
the participating insurers disproportionately represent solo and small firms. 
Despite these limitations, the Standing Committee studies are informative. 
First, they are a window into what information LPL insurers and the Standing 
Committee expected to be important and reliably obtained. For each claim the 
insurers recorded the number of lawyers insured by the policy (a reasonable proxy 
for firm size),52 the number of years the defendant had been practicing, whether 
the claim arose out of an attempt to collect a fee, whether the claim arose out of 
an area of law “normal to the insured’s practice” or “not normal,” the area of law 
in which the defendant was retained by the client, the major activity in which the 
defendant was engaged at the time of the alleged error, “the one alleged error or 
misconduct which is the most significant to the cause of the claim being made,” 
the disposition of the claim (e.g., no payment, settlement, judgment), the amount 
of loss expense and any claim payment, along with a few other less noteworthy 
topics. With only two exceptions,53 the updates have maintained the same 
categories, allowing for comparison across time subject to the data limitations 
already noted. 
The results of the studies are also informative. Most significantly, according 
to one senior reinsurance underwriter: 
Prior to that study, underwriters were, in my estimation, unduly focused 
on area of practice. They would … come to conclusions like this: “Oh. 
This law firm has three attorneys. They’re focused in providing legal 
 
CLAIMS 2000–2003 (2005) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE]; AM. BAR 
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS 2004–2007 (2008) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE]; AM. BAR 
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS 2008–2011 (2012) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE]. 
50. See ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 3. 
51. All of the updates contain cautionary language similar to the following: 
This claim-by-claim reporting system proved to be cumbersome and was abandoned after 
the [initial] study. The 1995 though 2011 studies are based on calendar-year summary 
report forms completed by participating companies based on their own internal data. We 
asked insurers to do their best in assigning their data to the established 1985 categories. 
While the recent studies use the same general data categories as the 1985 study, the 
categories do not always correspond to those used by participating insurers. In some 
instances, the Committee had to eliminate incompatible insurer data. 
See, e.g., id. As a result, the number of observations differs considerably across the Standing 
Committee Studies’ data fields, with no way to assess how the missing data affect the generalizability 
of the results other than to provide significant grounds for caution. 
52. Of note, the categories for number of lawyers were: one, two to five, six to thirty, and 
over thirty. GATES & SWETIN, supra note 23, at 508–09 (providing a copy of the reporting form). 
53. The normal/not normal and the years of practice coding are not included in later studies. 
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services connected with the issuance of municipal bonds. Municipal 
bonds have gone into bankruptcy. Lawyers have been held responsible, in 
part, for that. Therefore, I’m not gonna write areas of practice in which 
law firms or areas—or law firms with heavy areas of practice in 
providing legal services for municipal bonds.” 
It became this idea of, if you could only steer around certain areas of 
practice, you could underwrite safely. What this study showed, on a 
number of levels, was that the majority of lawyers professional liability 
claims had as their origin, not a failure of substantive knowledge. 
Meaning the practitioner, if he spent any considerable time in a particular 
area, pretty well knew what to do, mechanically, in the practice of law. 
What he may not have done well was an administrative issue. He may not 
have issued an engagement letter, issued a disengagement letter, run a 
conflict of interest clearance, had a docket control system, had a backup 
on a docket control system. It was all these administrative things where 
the majority of claims, when you traced it back to the origins, not all of 
them, but the majority of them, tended to lend itself to the idea that wow, 
these practitioners are missing some administrative management issue, as 
opposed to failing in some substantive area of law. 
. . . Likewise, underwriters, as they began underwriting these law firms . . . 
began incorporating some of the ideas, in that study, into their 
applications, into their questionnaires, into just the casual questions 
they’d ask a broker or directly to the law firm about how do you do what 
you do, and focus predominately on administrative issues. 
The reason was that study.54 
In fact, and contrary to the recollection of this underwriter, the study found 
that alleged substantive errors were just as frequent as the sum of what the 
Standing Committee referred to as “administrative”55 and “client relations” 
errors56 (both of which were likely subsumed in what the underwriter referred to 
as “administrative issues”). Nevertheless, the fact that this senior underwriter 
remembered that the study found that administrative issues were more frequent 
than substantive errors only serves to emphasize how influential the administrative 
error finding was. Administrative and client-relations errors occurred across the 
entire spectrum of practice areas and in firms of all sizes (though more frequently, 
relative to other alleged errors, in the smaller firms).57 And, perhaps, 
 
54. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19. 
55. The leading “administrative errors” are: “failure to calendar properly,” “failure to react to 
calendar,” “failure to file documents where no deadline is involved,” and “procrastination in 
performance of service or lack of follow up.” See infra Table 2; infra note 68. 
56. The “client relations” errors are: “failure to follow client’s instructions,” “failure to obtain 
client’s consent or to inform client,” “improper withdrawal from representation.” Many of these 
claims would seem to fit within the reinsurance underwriter’s definition of “administrative issues.” 
See infra Table 2; infra note 68. 
57. See ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 21 
(administrative plus client-related errors account for 44% of alleged errors in solo firms, 42% in two-
to-five-lawyer firms, 42% in six-to-thirty-lawyer firms, and only 28% in thirty-or-more-lawyer firms). 
See also Telephone Interview with Actuary 1 (Dec. 7, 2013): 
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administrative and client-relations errors could be controlled, an important point 
that led the bar and LPL insurers to begin to focus more on loss prevention. 
The ABA Standing Committee study also confirmed that, as LPL insurers 
already suspected, the number of claims and the size of the resulting losses 
differed by practice area as well as geography. The two practice areas with the 
most claims in the Standing Committee data have consistently been plaintiffs’ 
personal injury and real estate.58 Numbers three and four have generally been 
family law and “estate, trust and probate.”59 These practice areas are all among the 
most common, especially among lawyers in solo practice or small firms, so it is 
not necessarily the case that these practice areas have higher rates of claims, 
though insurance pricing practices suggest that they do.60 These basic elements—
practice area and geography—along with the number of lawyers and past claim 
experience, remain the fundamental building blocks of solo- and small-law-firm 
LPL insurance pricing today.61 
In contrast to the closed-claim studies of medical malpractice claims 
 
On the size of firm, it kind of became a little bit self-evident. When I looked at the loss 
information when you side the loss information with the underwriting information. 
Basically, when I matched up the size of firm with their loss data, you saw definite breaks 
in the data. You saw solos—astronomical frequencies. Their frequencies were tenfold 
every other law firm. Two and third man law firms, their frequency wasn’t nearly as high 
as a solo, but it was pretty high. Then you got down to five to ten, and there were actually 
natural breaking points in the data based upon the claim frequency, so I started there. I 
didn’t see it quite as much on the severity side on the size of firm. Where I saw the more 
natural breaking points for severity for the average cost of the claim, came on the area of 
practice. 
58. See infra Table 1. 
59. Id. 
60. Insurers have charged somewhat higher prices for these practice areas in the small firm 
LPL market. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter 2, supra note 16 (noting that “real estate, 
which is a much maligned area of practice these days within the LPL business.”). One reinsurer 
explained that price when rating practice area, his firm considered whether the firm did “heavy 
plaintiff work or is it real basic estate work?” Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 2, supra note 35. In 
addition, his firm rated “corporate M&A, securities work, [and] intellectual property” as more risky. 
One CEO also explained that practice area was a very important factor for pricing, but suggested that 
the practice areas that were high risk were different than the ones identified in the ABA Standing 
Committee study: 
[O]ur view of the claim environment is now much more focused on area practice. Is the 
law firm working in a high hazard area or not? The groupings are pretty consistent—
securities, IT, IP, entertainment—are all on the high hazard end of the equation. Things 
like criminal law, insurance defense, legal aid, arbitration mediation—family law 
probably—are on the less hazard end of the spectrum. 
CEO1. Presumably, they know the number of lawyers practicing in these areas relative to the size of 
the bar as a whole. 
61. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter 3 (Oct. 22, 2013): 
I think you asked a good question there and really there’s kind of three main things that I 
think most carriers—and again, this is the part that our company gets nervous on when I 
talk about what most carriers do. There’s three main things that most carriers would look 
at when they think about underwriting law firms and those are size, services and location. 
How big is it, what are the particular areas of practice that they and almost every carrier 
has an area of practice grid that law firms have to fill out explaining what percentage of 
either their revenues or billings come from each individual area of practice. Ours is pretty 
extensive. It has sixty different classifications. 
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conducted at about the same time,62 the Standing Committee study did not 
attempt to evaluate the merits of the claims. Instead, the study simply reported the 
outcome of the closed claims—67% were closed with no payment. Of the claims 
closed with payment, only 38% (12% of all claims) followed commencement of a 
suit, indicating that most paid claims were paid outside of the formal civil justice 
process. Only about 4% of paid claims (1% of all claims) involved a judgment for 
the plaintiff. 
Figure 1 below shows the disposition of claims reported in all of the ABA 
Standing Committee Studies.63 Across the thirty-year time period covered in the 
studies, about 50% to 60% of claims are abandoned without payment (except for 
an outlier of 33% in the 1995 study) and another 10% to 20% are adjudicated in 
favor of the defendant, with the rest resulting in a payment. Of the claims resolved 
with a payment, most are paid without suit and less than 10% (usually much less) 
after a trial. The large percentage of paid claims settled presuit, and the lack of any 
attempt on the part of the Study participants to challenge the merits of paid 
claims, suggests that the Study participants thought that paid claims were 
reasonably meritorious.64 This is, of course, also the conclusion of all of the well-
designed closed-claim medical malpractice studies.65 
Because of the changing composition of the participating insurers, the nature 
of the sample, and the change in the method of collecting the data, the Standing 
Committee’s updates do not provide statistically reliable information about the 
overall rate of claiming. There are progressively more claims per year in the studies 
over time, which is to be expected given two things: the growth in the number of 
lawyers,66 and greater participation by insurers in providing data, especially in the 
most recent study. Accordingly, the only sensible way to use the Standing 
Committee data is to compare the distribution of claims and disposition in 
percentage terms, rather than absolute numbers, over time. As is clear from Figure 
 
62. See BAKER, supra note 45, at 77–83 (2005) (summarizing medical malpractice closed-claim 
studies). 
63. ABA STANDING COMM., 1990S PROFILE, supra note 49, at 12; ABA STANDING COMM., 
1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 64; ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999 PROFILE, supra 
note 49, at 10; ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 8; ABA STANDING 
COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 9; ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE, supra 
note 49, at 10. 
64. The choice not to make an attempt to evaluate the merits of the claims may simply be a 
question of resources. Closed-claim studies are expensive and time consuming. It is also possible that 
the organized Bar is more prepared than organized Medicine to believe that the legal system does a 
decent job of weeding out nonmeritorious claims and calibrating claim payments to reflect the 
strength of the plaintiffs’ case. 
65. BAKER, supra note 45, at 77–83; see also Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501 (2005) 
(describing the flaws in the only closed-claim study to reach a contrary conclusion). 
66. According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract, the number of employed lawyers and judges in 
the U.S. grew from 547,000 in 1980 to 1.10 million in 2010. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS 402 tbl.675 (1981); U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS 394 
tbl.615 (2011). The number of lawyers and judges was not reported separately for 1980. For 2010, the 
number of employed lawyers was 1.04 million and the number of employed judges was 71,000. 
2015] LIABILITY INSURER DATA AS A WINDOW 1293 
1, the distribution of the disposition of claims has been relatively stable over time. 
 
 
 
Table 1 and Figure 2 show the mix of claims by practice area and type of 
alleged error over time.67 Both show stability among the share of claims 
attributable to different practice areas and to general categories of errors. 
Although Table 1 shows change in the distribution of claims attributable to 
different practice areas, real estate, personal injury, family law, and trusts and 
estates have consistently maintained the top four spots. 
 
67. ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 6, 8; ABA 
STANDING COMM., 1990S PROFILE, supra note 49, at 7, 14; ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999 
PROFILE, supra note 49, at 5, 12; ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 4, 9; 
ABA STANDING COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 4, 7; ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–
2011 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 5, 9. 
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Figure 1: Disposition of  Claims
(from ABA Standing Committee)
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Table 1
Percent of Claims by Practice Area (from ABA Standing Committee) 
  2011 2007 2003 1999 1995 1985 
AREA OF LAW % % % % % % 
Real Estate 20.3 20.1 16.5 17.0 14.4 23.3 
Personal Injury - Plaintiff 15.6 21.6 20.0 24.6 21.7 25.1 
Family Law 12.1 10.3 9.6 10.1 9.1 7.9 
Estate, Trust and Probate 10.7 9.7 8.6 8.7 7.6 7.0 
Collection and Bankruptcy 9.2 7.3 7.9 8.0 7.9 10.5 
Corporate/Business Org. 6.8 4.9 6.4 8.6 8.9 5.3 
Subtotal 74.7 73.8 68.9 76.9 69.5 79.0 
Criminal 5.7 5.1 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.3 
Business Trans. 
Commercial 
4.1 4.7 3.2 3.6 10.7 3.0 
Personal Injury - Defense 3.3 2.9 10.0 4.1 3.3 3.2 
Labor Law 2.2 1.4 1.6 2.2 1.4 0.7 
Worker's Compensation 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.9 3.3 2.1 
Patent, Trademark, 
Copyright 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.6 
Taxation 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.6 
Civil Rights 
Discrimination 
0.8 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.6 1.1 
Immigration/ 
Naturalization 
0.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 
Construction (Building 
Contracts) 
0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8 
Local Government 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.7 
Government 
Contracts/Claims 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Securities (S.E.C.) 0.6 0.9 1.8 1.5 1.9 2.0 
Consumer Claims 0.4 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 
Natural Resources 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Environment Law 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Admiralty 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Antitrust 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
International Law 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the rate of administrative and client-relations errors, 
combined, is consistently about the same as that of substantive errors, with the 
exception of the 1999 update, which found a higher substantive to administrative 
error ratio. 
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This long-term stability in the distribution of errors by type and practice area 
helps to explain the recent shift away from a focus on risk management in LPL 
pricing in the small law firm market.68 Historically, the NABRICO firms (and 
some commercial firms) priced, in significant part, on risk management. When 
commercial insurers were pulling out of the market in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the first NABRICO companies took a different approach to providing 
insurance. Rather than follow exactly in the footsteps of the withdrawing 
commercial insurers, which had until that time been focused more on area of 
practice and geography,69 these NABRICO companies decided to investigate the 
“original cause” of the claims, determining whether the claim was “fortuitous, or 
was there a cause of events that could have been prevented, and if so, what are the 
practices that need to be laid in place to prevent that sort of claim from happening 
in the future.”70 This instinct to investigate was part of what led to the initial ABA 
 
68. The data from Figure 2 are reproduced below in Table 2 with additional granularity—the 
major categories of errors and wrongs are broken into smaller units of analysis. The one notable area 
of long-term decline is calendaring errors, which have declined from 11% of claims in the 1985 study 
to 4% in the 2011 study. Conversely, one area of increase in the most recent study is lost files, 
documents, or evidence, growing to over 7% from less than 1% in all of the previous studies. 
69. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19 (“Prior to that study, underwriters 
were, in my estimation, unduly focused on area practice.”). 
70. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with CEO 1, supra note 15, explaining why he avoided 
solo practitioners: 
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Standing Committee study discussed above. 
 
Table 2
Percent of Claims by Type of Alleged Error  
(from ABA Standing Committee) 
 2011 2007 2003 1999 1995 1985 
TYPE OF ACTIVITY % % % % % % 
ADMINISTRATIVE ERRORS      
Procrastination in Performance/ 
Follow-up 
9.68 4.24 9.43 4.95 8.68 4.96 
Lost File, Document Evidence 7.05 0.60 0.37 0.40 0.57 0.68 
Failure to Calendar Properly 4.34 7.44 5.19 7.03 6.75 11.46 
Clerical Error 3.54 2.04 4.74 1.25 2.14 1.50 
Failure to File Document - No Deadline 3.17 10.73 4.28 1.54 2.69 4.33 
Failure to React to Calendar 2.34 3.57 4.35 1.27 6.35 3.58 
Subtotal 30.13 28.63 28.35 16.43 27.18 26.50 
CLIENT RELATIONS ERRORS       
Failure to Obtain Consent/ 
Inform Client 
7.02 5.31 5.75 11.89 9.77 9.46 
Failure to Follow Client's Instruction 5.71 3.22 6.72 3.93 5.06 5.75 
Improper Withdrawal of Representation 1.87 2.70 2.10 2.93 2.14 1.53 
Subtotal 14.61 11.22 14.57 18.75 16.97 16.74 
Admin. + Client Errors Subtotal 44.74 39.85 42.92 35.18 44.15 43.24 
SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS      
Failure to Know/Properly Apply Law 13.57 11.51 10.98 21.90 11.05 9.74 
Inadequate Discovery/Investigation 7.82 8.10 10.37 6.13 10.24 9.21 
Planning Error - Procedure Choice  7.39 9.44 7.72 3.21 10.87 7.88 
Failure to Know/Ascertain Deadline 6.91 6.38 7.09 15.24 6.97 7.03 
Conflict of Interest 4.28 4.79 6.28 5.12 3.79 3.45 
Error in Public Record Search 3.03 4.02 2.54 2.65 1.24 4.86 
Failure Understand/Anticipate Tax 1.37 1.73 1.26 1.57 1.96 1.89 
Error Mathematical Calculation 0.69 0.64 1.04 0.48 0.44 0.78 
Subtotal 45.07 46.61 47.28 56.29 46.55 44.84 
INTENTIONAL WRONGS      
Fraud 4.53 5.82 3.35 2.11 3.19 4.28 
Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process 3.43 3.88 3.59 4.09 3.70 4.32 
Violation of Civil Rights 1.27 1.87 1.26 1.15 1.29 1.78 
Libel or Slander 0.96 1.96 1.59 1.18 1.11 1.54 
Subtotal 10.19 13.53 9.79 8.53 9.29 11.92 
GRAND TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Today, pricing in the small firm market is formula driven with less emphasis 
on risk management.71 Although different companies place emphases on different 
 
Solo practitioners didn’t have the wherewithal to really manage, from a risk management 
standpoint, a business in the kind of way that would be safe from claim activity. They 
didn’t have the money. They would have insufficient calendaring systems. They would 
have insufficient or inadequate conflict systems. They would have—they wouldn’t use 
form letters with regard to engagement or disengagement. Small firms or sole practitioners 
simply wouldn’t have the time, quite frankly, to focus on that type of thing and still trying 
to eke out a living. 
71. Telephone Interview with CEO 1, supra note 15: 
Just a few years ago our pricing was based on kind of a test. Our application in essence was 
a screening test to determine just how tight and how well-run your office was. We asked 
questions about things like your docket control, your conflict system, your calendaring 
system, your intake procedures, your engagement letters and depending upon how you 
answered those, then we would score you. Depending upon what that score was, it equated 
to a rate. We had like basically three different rating levels—good, bad and average, if you 
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factors, there is a clear focus on the traditional factors of area of practice, 
geography, and number of lawyers. That is not to say that risk management is 
completely unimportant in pricing, it is just weighted less on pricing scales than it 
may have once been. Although we do not have information to corroborate this 
point, it may be that insurers believe that technological advances have made 
administrative tasks such as calendaring and conflicts checking easier. 
Alternatively, the relatively consistent distribution of claims by practice area and 
type of error from 1980 to 2011 reflected in Table 1 and Figure 2 may have 
convinced insurers that the adoption of easily observable risk management 
practices by small law firms does not change their risk profiles very much. 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the distribution of claims according to the amount 
of the payment to the claimant and the amount of money spent on “expense” (i.e. 
defense), respectively.72 As with the figures above, Figures 3, 4, and 5 show each 
category of claim as a percentage of overall claims because the participating 
insurers, the sample, and the methods of collecting data have changed over time 
such that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of claims themselves. 
Figures 3 and 4 are further complicated because the Standing Committee changed 
the categories in which it reported claims by payment to claimants over time. Until 
2007 the Committee reported $0 payment claims together with claims paid in 
amounts up to $10,000 in a single category, thereby not permitting the separation 
of paid and $0 payment claims. Thus, in order to make the results of the studies 
comparable while retaining this important distinction, Figure 3 reports the 2007 
and 2011 results with the $0 payment claims separate from and combined with the 
$1 to $10,000 paid claims. In the 1985 study the category of “over $100,000” was 
the largest category. Accordingly, Figure 3 reports the “over $100,000” category 
 
will. We rated accordingly and then what we filed with the states reflected those scores and 
that kind of philosophy. Today it’s much more driven by area practice and we typically 
say—we ask questions now more tailored to, “How much do you do in a specific area of 
law?” Based on the percentages that the applicant sends back, our rating model basically 
does the math. 
This change was corroborated by several other interviews. As one reinsurer stated: 
We’re invisible in the whole process; at least we should be. The better the application, the 
fewer questions we have to ask and that’s a good thing. Then the way we rate it and so 
forth is pretty much similar to how everybody else does: number of attorneys; 
modification for good claims or bad claims; modification for what they do from a risk 
management perspective; reputational respect, those types of things. Modification for 
where they’re operating: Those types of things, and then just their practice factor, so is it 
all heavy plaintiff work or is it real basic estate work? Those types of things. 
Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 2 (May 3, 2014). Similarly, an actuary we interviewed explained 
that the top three items that make up the price are the number of attorneys, the state where the firm 
practices, and the practice areas of the insureds. See Telephone Interview with Actuary 2 (Nov. 1, 
2013); see also Telephone Interview with Underwriter 2, supra note 16 (explaining the entire rating 
structure for credits and debits based, inter alia, on geography, area of practice, number of lawyers, and 
loss). 
72. ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 65; ABA STANDING 
COMM., 1990S PROFILE, supra note 49, at 15; ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999 PROFILE, supra 
note 49, at 16; ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 13; ABA STANDING 
COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 13; ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE, 
supra note 49, at 14. 
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for all years as well as separately breaking out the larger payment categories for the 
follow up studies. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of indemnity payments made to claimants 
even when the insurer paid nothing. Figure 4 shows the total number of claims in 
each category as a percentage of the total number of claims paid. That is, Figure 4 
displays the percentage of all claims paid for those years (2007 and 2011) that we 
have the data distinguishing between paid and unpaid claims. All dollars are 
nominal. Figure 5 expands the picture by showing the distribution of the expenses 
paid, not just indemnity payments. In other words, Figure 5 takes account of other 
claim expenses, like defense costs. 
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The precise distribution reflected in Figures 3, 4, and 5 is less important than 
the remarkable stability that is demonstrated. Figures 3, 4, and 5 reflect the usual 
trend in liability claims generally, large numbers of small claims and increasingly 
fewer claims at higher levels of payment and defense expense. Consistent with the 
results shown in Figure 1 regarding disposition of claims, Figure 3 shows that 
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there is a very high percentage of $0 claims in the two studies for which those 
claims were separately reported (2007 and 2011). Figure 5 shows that the 
percentage of claims with zero or de minimis expense payment (less than $1000) is 
consistently high across all of the studies, strongly suggesting that a substantial 
majority of the claims reported to insurers never pose a realistic threat of 
liability.73 Very few claims in the ABA studies result in payments of $1 million or 
more, and a substantial number of those may well represent payments by CNA, 
Zurich, or other commercial insurers on behalf of larger law firms. 
The ABA Standing Committee reports show significant stability over time in 
a number of areas. First, over time, and as found in most closed-claims studies, 
the majority of claims brought are either dismissed in favor of the defendants or 
abandoned. Second, over time, about 45% of all claims are brought as a result of 
either defendants’ administrative errors or client-relationship errors. The 
remainder is the result of substantive legal errors. Third, the data show significant 
stability in the distribution of indemnity and overall claim payments. 
That said, the conclusions to be drawn from these data might be quite 
limited. First, the Standing Committee studies do not provide much that is useful 
regarding medium to large law firms. This is not a criticism of the Standing 
Committee. Rather, it is the inevitable result of the fact that, with the exception of 
five years of data provided by ALAS for the 1995 study, none of the large law 
firm mutual insurers provided data to the Standing Committee, nor, with the 
significant exception of CNA and Zurich, did many of the commercial insurance 
companies that insure larger law firms. Further, in the solo- and small-firm 
market, a significant percentage of lawyers may be uninsured. As such, even if the 
sample is representative of insured lawyers practicing in small or solo firms, the 
findings may not be generalizable to all lawyers practicing in that market. 
Moreover, the data we present here are limited to the survey responses solicited 
and reported from insurers. We do not have detailed claims studies from which to 
draw more precise conclusions. 
Despite these limitations, the Standing Committee reports are important in 
light of the sway they held in the formation of the LPL market.74 Further, these 
are the best publicly available data and, as such, present, at least a reasonable 
window into claims and claiming against small and solo firms. 
B. ALAS Annual Reports as a Window on Larger Firm Liability 
As limited as the Standing Committee findings are, at least there has been 
some organized effort to collect data about the small and solo firms. There are no 
corresponding publicly available data that aggregate the claims records of the 
insurers of medium and large law firms. The large law firm mutual insurers are 
 
73. The high rate of nonserious claims likely results in part from the strict notice reporting 
requirements in LPL insurance policies, pursuant to which law firms that delay reporting claims face a 
substantial risk of losing coverage for the claim. See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 1, at 454–69 
(discussing insurance liability cases). 
74. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
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notoriously and understandably secretive, with the partial exception of ALAS, 
which insures a sufficiently large number of firms that it can release some data in 
a manner that does not expose its members. The Minet brokerage firm, acquired 
by Aon in 1997, has for many years represented a large percentage of the large law 
firm market, but it derives a competitive advantage from its resulting access to 
claims-related information that we expect that it would be reluctant to give up. 
As a result, the only publicly available large law firm claims numbers are 
those contained in the annual reports of ALAS. Those reports have never been 
systematically collected and analyzed in a public forum. With considerable effort, 
we have obtained all of the ALAS Annual Reports, from the first report issued in 
1981 through the most recent report issued in 2014. These reports contain 
information about premiums, limits, self-insured retentions, and claims in addition 
to financial information about ALAS and a complete listing of member law firms. 
Ours is the first published effort to compile and use the data from these reports as 
a window on large law firm liability. 
ALAS has long been the single largest insurer of medium to large law firms 
in the United States. A more complete description of ALAS awaits future work. 
For present purposes what matters most are the ways in which ALAS members 
are, and are not, representative of U.S. law firms. 
The first important difference is size. ALAS members are much larger than 
the vast majority of U.S. law firms. This first difference is part of what makes the 
ALAS data such a useful complement to the ABA Standing Committee studies. 
ALAS members are a sample—admittedly a convenience sample—of the 
population of law firms that is most underrepresented in the ABA Standing 
Committee data. A firm must have at least thirty-five lawyers to be eligible for 
membership in ALAS, and most ALAS member firms are considerably larger.75 
Of the 224 member firms listed in the 2013 ALAS annual report, seventy-seven 
are in the 2014 AmLaw 200, which is a listing prepared by American Law Media 
of the 200 largest law firms as determined by annual revenues.76 Twenty-eight of 
the ALAS member firms are in the AmLaw 100.77 
A second important difference is geography. For many years, ALAS did not 
permit firms based in New York City to join, and it placed significant restrictions 
on law firms based in California, thereby excluding an important segment of the 
medium- to large-law-firm population.78 The current ALAS membership reflects 
 
75. See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2000) 
(noting that ALAS required firms to have thirty-five or more practicing attorneys). 
76. Compare Revenue Growth Strengthens, AM. LAW.: THE HAVES AND HAVE-NOTS, June 2013, 
at 75, 75–76; and A New Number One, AM. LAW., supra note 11, at 137, 137, 139–42, with 2013 ALAS 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 79–83. We determined the number of ALAS members in the 
AmLaw 200 by comparing the list in this issue of the American Lawyer to the list of ALAS members 
in the 2013 Annual Report. 
77. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6; A New Number One, AM. LAW., supra note 11, 
at 137, 137–38. We determined the number of ALAS members in the AmLaw 100 by comparing the 
list in this issue of the American Lawyer to the list of ALAS members in the 2013 Annual Report. 
78. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that ALAS originally excluded firms from 
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this historic practice. The ALAS member firms listed in the 2013 annual report do 
not include any truly large firms based in New York City, San Francisco, or Los 
Angeles, in marked contrast to firms based in Chicago, DC, Boston, and 
Philadelphia.79 In part as a result of this historic practice, the large New York City 
firms and many of the large California firms formed their own mutual insurance 
arrangements, which we described above. This difference means that what can be 
learned from the ALAS convenience sample may not be generalizable to the large 
New York City and California law firm experience. 
A third important difference relates to the ALAS commitment to loss 
prevention and claims management. ALAS requires its members to make a 
significant commitment to ALAS-mediated risk and claim management 
practices.80 This requirement likely produces some selection bias: law firms that 
find this requirement congenial and law firms that find it unacceptable are likely 
to differ from one another in ways that may impact their LPL-claims profiles. The 
requirement may also result in different patterns of liability among ALAS member 
firms that are otherwise similar to nonmember firms. If this difference makes a 
difference, then the frequency and severity of claims within the ALAS 
convenience sample should be less than prevails outside that sample. 
Despite these very significant limitations on the generalizability of what can 
be learned from ALAS data, there are good reasons to believe that the results of 
the analysis do provide useful information for the medium- to large-law-firm 
market generally. The LPL insurance market appears to be a competitive one. It 
appears that at least some commercial carriers look at the ALAS rates in setting 
their own.81 Our law firm, broker, and commercial insurance company 
respondents also all reported that brokers and commercial LPL insurers regularly 
attempt to persuade ALAS members to leave ALAS and move to the commercial 
market.82 Further, our respondents reported that ALAS is open to new 
members.83 For these reasons we conclude that ALAS pricing (and, thus, by 
 
that had their principal office in New York City). 
79. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 79–83. 
80. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 17–20, 25–26 (detailing ALAS’s 
loss-prevention services and policy of remedial actions for firms that do not meet its requirements). 
81. See Telephone Interview with Executive 3, supra note 28: 
I mean, again, we started out with the ALAS rates. It’s kind of like the beginning 
benchmark when we started underwriting, and saying, “Okay, look, if it’s an average firm 
across the board—and an average firm, of course, will have some claims because ALAS 
certainly does have claims—they’ll have some claims activity that’ll creep up above the 
retention sometimes, and we’ll take a look at that.” 
82. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Broker 5 (Nov. 7, 2013) (“We would always do sort of a 
competitive analysis, not on financial security necessarily, but really on pricing volatility type issues, so 
that we could talk to members of ALAS about putting them into the commercial market or helping 
them understand the difference.”); Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 12 (July 13, 
2014) (“I think there is—one of the arguments that commercial carriers make—we get solicited a fair 
amount—is, ‘If you come with us, you’re going to pay X dollars a lawyer, and that’s Y dollars less 
than what you’re paying at ALAS.’”). 
83. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 4 (May 9, 2013) (“Q: Have 
you ever considered being part of ALAS? R: Yes, we were—we talked to ALAS a number of times 
and we actually were invited to join ALAS a couple years ago. I have very close relationships with the 
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operation of arithmetic, ALAS claims experience) cannot over the long term 
diverge too sharply from the commercial market. If ALAS long-term prices were 
much lower than the commercial market, then more law firms would be 
attempting to join. If ALAS long-term prices were much higher than the 
commercial market, then ALAS would be unable to maintain its membership. 
How much is “too much” is a subject for additional research. For present 
purposes the ALAS data that we report are sufficiently likely to be at least 
directionally informative about large law firm liability generally to justify the effort 
involved in compilation and analysis. 
Unlike the Standing Committee studies, the ALAS data allow us to reach 
conclusions about lawyers professional liability and insurance within a population 
of firms over time—ALAS member firms. For all years since 1983 the ALAS 
annual reports contain the following claim related information in a manner that is 
sufficiently consistent to permit comparison over time: the cumulative number of 
“real claims” reported by members per calendar year (defined as “all claims other 
that those initially classified as without merit”),84 the number of real claims 
reported per one thousand lawyers per year, the number of claims reported per 
calendar year by area of practice, and the cumulative gross incurred loss per 
calendar year by area of practice. Figures 6 through 9 on the following pages 
present some of the highlights of the ALAS claims data in simple chart form. 
Figure 6 shows the number of real claims per one thousand lawyers reported 
to ALAS each year from 1983 to 2013. Apart from a sharp uptick in the first two 
years (which is likely to be the result of a transition in claims reporting as ALAS 
members shifted from reporting their claims to their prior insurers under older, 
occurrence-based coverage to ALAS, rather than a sharp increase in claims 
brought against ALAS members) and a peak in the very early 1990s, the long-term 
trend is a slow decline, from a peak of 11.4 real claims per one thousand lawyers 
in 1991 to 7.5 real claims per one thousand lawyers in 2013. To the extent that 
these numbers can be extrapolated to large law firms generally, this gradual 
decline suggests that the large growth in the number of lawyers practicing in large 
law firms in the United States since the early 1990s has not been accompanied by 
a corresponding growth in the number of LPL claims brought against lawyers 
practicing in large law firms.85 Whether this reflects instantiation of norms of 
professional conduct, better risk management, the difficulty of bringing these 
claims, or something else is indiscernible from this data. 
 
 
people at ALAS.”). 
84. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11. 
85. See generally Aric Press, Big Law’s Reality Check, AM. LAW., Nov. 2014, at 40, 43–44. 
1304 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:273 
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of total claims filed each year by practice area.86 In 
this chart the gray scale areas that appear from bottom to top in the chart 
 
86. ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1984 ANNUAL REPORT (1984); 
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1985 ANNUAL REPORT (1985); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. 
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT (1987); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y 
LTD., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT (1989); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1989 ANNUAL 
REPORT (1990); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT (1991); 
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT (1992); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. 
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1993); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y 
LTD., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT (1994); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1995 ANNUAL 
REPORT (1996) ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997); 
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. 
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y 
LTD., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT (2000); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2000 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2001); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002); 
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT (2003); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. 
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (2004); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y 
LTD., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2005); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2005 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2006); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT (2007); 
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT (2008); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. 
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (2009); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y 
LTD., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2010); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2011); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT (2012); 
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2013); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. 
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2014). 
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Figure 6: Real Claims per 1000 Lawyers
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correspond to the gray scale legend at the bottom, running from left to right. For 
example, the bottom area of the chart shows the percent of claims in the 
corporate/banking practice area, and the top area of the chart shows the percent 
of claims in all practice areas other than those specifically listed. 
There is one important caveat about the data shown in Figure 7. ALAS 
provides only cumulative data about the number of claims filed; ALAS does not 
provide the total number of claims per practice on an annual basis. That is, ALAS 
provides only the total number of claims per practice area from the beginning of 
ALAS to the current reporting period.87 Our attempts to calculate marginal yearly 
data—by simply subtracting one year from the next—yielded odd results. For 
example, in several years, across several different practice areas, the annualized per 
claim numbers were negative. This may be because ALAS reclassified a claim 
from a real claim to a frivolous claim, reclassified a claim from one area of 
practice to another, or some other unknown reason. Because of these strange 
results, we present only the cumulative data. Further, because the number of 
lawyers insured affects the number of cumulative claims, we present only the 
distribution of the cumulative claims. 
One problem with the cumulative—as opposed to annualized—data is that 
the chart is not very sensitive to yearly changes in the distribution of claims. Even 
if the number of litigation claims spiked over a couple of year period, the figure 
would not reflect that trend with a similar spike. In other words, the right hand 
side of the chart is not particularly sensitive to annual changes in the number of 
claims in a given practice area because the annual change is not likely enough to 
change the cumulative distribution of claims. Figure 7 might nonetheless be useful 
as a holistic picture of the market and of the way insurers might consider the risks 
presented. 
Litigation is the practice area with the largest number of claims, with 
corporate/banking in second place, followed at some distance by trusts and 
estates, real estate, and securities. (Corporate and banking are lumped together 
because ALAS did not report them separately until 1991.) ALAS does not report 
the number of lawyers practicing in these areas, and we were unable to obtain 
historical practice area information for ALAS member firms, so we do not have a 
way to assess whether the rate of claims per lawyer varies across those practice 
groups. Our sense is that corporate and litigation practice groups are the largest 
practice groups in most large law firms, so the higher frequency of claims in those 
practice areas likely reflects the number of lawyers involved rather than a higher 
per lawyer frequency risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
87. In 1995, ALAS did not report cumulative claims. Rather ALAS reported the percentage of 
cumulative claims per practice area as we have done in Figure 7. 
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Figure 8 shows the distribution of cumulative gross loss for each year by the 
same practice areas,88 and it should be read with the same caveat and in the same 
manner as Figure 7. Importantly, gross loss is not the same as claims paid data. 
Gross loss is a measure of the cost of claims to ALAS. That cost includes both 
actual claim-related payments as of the date of the reporting and the reserves 
ALAS put aside as an estimate of the future expenses for that claim.89 Given that 
part of the cost of claims—the reserves—are an estimate, the actual cost of a 
given claim might change from year to year. For this reason, the data reported by 
ALAS on cumulative gross loss are also not amenable to modification to 
annualized losses. The result, again, is that the data for 2013, for instance, includes 
 
88. See sources cited supra note 86. 
89. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 (“This metric comprises the expected 
ultimate cost of claims reported in the current underwriting period plus any change in projected 
ultimate claim costs related to prior underwriting periods, without taking reinsurance into account. It 
also includes ALAS’s internal expenses for claims management and loss prevention services.”). 
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all of the losses for each category from 1987 to 2013. Thus, the distribution across 
categories is less likely to change significantly on the right hand side of the chart. 
Even really big payouts in a given category may be a drop in the bucket compared 
to the cumulative effects of payments over twenty-five years. 
That said, the data are again useful for seeing a holistic picture of the losses. 
The corporate/banking practice area consistently has the largest share—close to 
50% in all years after 1989—followed by securities in the early years and litigation 
thereafter. As a comparison of Figures 7 and 8 reveals, litigation has always been 
responsible for a much larger percentage of total claims than total losses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the cumulative ALAS claims and loss data, confirming that 
litigation claims are much less expensive than corporate and banking claims.90 The 
area of practice with the largest average per claim severity is securities ($1.42M) 
followed by banking ($1.12M). The lowest average per claim severity is for 
litigation claims at only $165,300. All of these averages include defense costs, 
 
90. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. We consolidated certain practice areas 
for this table, including Administrative law, Bankruptcy, Divorce/Family Law, and Labor/
Employment into the Other category. We display claims deriving from Tax/ERISA practice areas in 
Table 3, but not in Figures 7 and 8, because ALAS did not report data on those practice areas 
throughout the sample. Conversely, we broke out Corporate and Banking practice areas because 
ALAS has tracked those areas separately since 1991. 
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which count as part of the insured loss in the ALAS standard policy.91 
Importantly, these averages do not include payments by the law firms themselves 
to satisfy their retentions before ALAS makes payments, nor do they include 
payments by excess insurers for those (very few) claims that exceed the limit of 
the ALAS coverage. Thus, the total average loss per claim in each practice area is 
larger. How much larger is impossible to say without taking these retentions and 
excess insurer payments into account. 
 
Table 3 
Cumulative Claims and Loss By Practice Area (1983-2013) 
  
 
Number 
of 
Claims 
% of all 
ALAS 
Claims 
Gross Loss 
(000s 
Omitted) 
% of All 
ALAS 
Gross 
Loss 
Mean Gross 
Loss per 
Claim (000s 
Omitted) 
Securities 522 4% $747,800 13% $1,432.6 
Banking 262 2% $294,600 5% $1,124.4 
Patent/Trademark/ 
Copyright 386 3% $255,400 5% $661.7 
Corporate 3627 26% $2,302,900 41% $634.9 
Tax/ERISA 564 4% $303,300 5% $537.8 
Real Estate 952 7% $312,100 6% $327.8 
Trusts & Estates 949 7% $208,700 4% $219.9 
Other 1254 9% $245,000 5% $195.4 
Litigation 5334 39% $881,700 16% $165.3 
 
ALAS began reporting information about law firm retentions in 1998 in a 
manner that is informative but does not permit a straightforward calculation of 
the total loss associated with ALAS claims, either in the aggregate or on a practice 
area basis. Figure 9 shows the average per claim retention for lawyers in ALAS 
member law firms.92 The dark line shows the average per claim retention in 
nominal dollars. The shaded line uses the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer 
Pricing Index for legal services to control for inflation.93 As Figure 9 shows, 
average per claim retentions were just under $800,000 in 1997 and grew to $1.4 
million in 2013. In real terms the average per lawyer retention has remained 
constant over the entire period of the available data. 
 
91. See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 9–10 (2012) 
(noting that gross claims expense is the expected ultimate costs of claims reported and includes 
actuarial predictions, reserves, and internal expenses); see also ATTORNEY’S LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y 
LTD., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1992) (noting that this number does not include expenses by 
member firms or within their retentions and giving an example of that amount for 1991). 
92. We used a three-year trailing average because of an anomaly in the way that the data were 
reported for policies issued in 2000 and 2001. 
93. The PPI numbers for legal services are tracked under number 5411 and provide an annual 
and monthly index from 1996 to the present. The data can be accessed using the industry number 
through the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. 
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If we make the reasonable assumption that larger law firms have higher 
retentions and more severe claims, it follows that it is not possible simply to add 
the average retention amount to ALAS’s average gross incurred loss in order to 
arrive at the average total incurred loss. Moreover, there are no publicly available 
data regarding the frequency or amount of payments made in excess of ALAS 
limits. Thus, all that can be said about the average gross loss per claim numbers is 
that they understate, perhaps substantially, the total defense and indemnity 
payments on an average claim. 
 
 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show ALAS per member LPL costs over time using two 
different metrics. The figures show the costs in nominal dollars in the dark black 
line and, for years beginning in 1997 (when the Bureau of Labor Statistics began 
tracking the producer price index for legal expenses) also in inflation-adjusted 
dollars in the thinner grey line. 
Figure 10 shows the annual per lawyer change in cumulative gross loss.94 
This measure of per lawyer LPL cost is computed by dividing the total number of 
lawyers in ALAS member firms during each year into the change in cumulative 
gross loss from the prior year. This metric is much less stable because it is strongly 
affected by year-to-year changes in reserves, which are based upon judgments that 
can change rapidly and typically do so over the course of the underwriting cycle.95 
As shown in Figure 10, this LPL cost metric follows the pattern of the liability 
insurance underwriting cycle that is familiar from work on medical malpractice 
 
94. See sources cited supra note 86. 
95. Baker, supra note 7, at 398–99. 
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liability insurance, with the difference that, in addition to the rapid increases in 
gross loss during the mid 1980s and early 2000s, there was also a rapid increase in 
gross loss in the early 1990s. This latter increase may be attributable to the early 
1990s peak in real claims per one thousand lawyers shown in Figure 1 (which did 
not occur in medical liability) 
Figure 11 shows the average per lawyer rate ALAS charges each year for an 
LPL insurance policy with a $20 million per claim and a $40 million annual 
aggregate limit, one of the kinds of insurance policies that ALAS has offered to its 
members every year since inception.96 The per lawyer rate for these twenty/forty 
policies differs according to the SIR; policies with higher SIRs have lower 
premiums. We show the average rate for all of the twenty/forty SIR combinations 
that have been consistently offered by ALAS. This rate is computed by averaging 
the rates ALAS offered for the $100,000, $250,000, and $500,000 retention levels 
at the $20/$40 million limit level from 1982 to 2013. In unreported work we have 
verified that the same general pattern of changes in rates over time holds true 
across all of the ALAS insurance policies. We present the average rate for the 
twenty/forty policies because a chart with a single line is easier to interpret than 
one with multiple lines. The figure follows the familiar pattern of the liability 
insurance underwriting cycle. For example, the rise in premiums in the early 1980’s 
reflects one of the most significant hard markets in liability insurance. The one 
difference, once again, is that there was also a rapid increase in premiums in the 
early 1990s. 
 
 
 
96. See sources cited supra note 86. 
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ALAS does not report claims disposition rates in a manner that is similar to 
the Standing Committee reports, so it is not possible to determine how the 
disposition rates of claims reported by ALAS members compare to those reported 
in the Standing Committee studies. The only dispositions that ALAS reports are 
trial results. Since its inception in the late 1970s ALAS has litigated to trial just 218 
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claims. In those cases, ALAS reports that it received a defense verdict in 153 cases 
and a reversal of a plaintiff’s verdict on appeal in another 17.97 This is a defendant 
trial success rate of 72% (similar to that in medical malpractice cases) and an 
overall adjudicatory success rate of 81%, suggesting that ALAS is making good 
judgments about which cases to take to trial.98 
ALAS does not report its claims according to the type of error or activity 
categories employed by the Standing Committee. Nevertheless some insights can 
be gleaned from the narratives in the claims management section of the annual 
reports. First, while ALAS does not publicly report claims by type of error or 
activity, it appears that, like other entities engaged in large law firm risk 
management, ALAS divides claims into three categories: “mistakes,” “conflicts of 
interest,” and “poor client quality.”99 Second, consistent with the findings of the 
Standing Committee, these “issues . . . cut across all practice areas and geographic 
locations . . . .”100 For insight into how those categories map on to major claims 
we turn next to summary data on large verdicts and settlements compiled by the 
leading LPL insurance brokerage firm. 
 
C.     The Aon Summary of Large Verdicts and Settlements 
Providing some insight into the breakdown between these categories of 
major claims, Aon loss prevention specialist and insurance law scholar Douglas 
Richmond has released a brief analysis of the largest publicly reported LPL 
verdicts and settlements since the mid 1980’s, sixty-four of which exceed $20 
million and twenty-eight of which exceed $35 million.101 The top two are a $108 
million settlement in 2004 and a $103 million verdict in 2010.102 While there is no 
comprehensive database that would allow us to determine how many additional 
settlements there are that are greater than $20 million and not included in his 
survey, our respondents suggest, “[t]hese sorts of debacles are hard to keep quiet,” 
and, thus, Richmond likely has identified most of the very large claims 
payments.103 
 
97. See 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11. 
98. BAKER, supra note 45, at 74 (reporting a defense trial success rate of 70%). 
99. See, e.g., ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2009) 
[hereinafter 2008 ALAS Annual Report]; 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. 
100. 2008 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 10; see also 2013 ALAS ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 12: 
As noted in the Leadership Letter, our firms continue to confront challenging economic 
and financial pressures that can affect the behavior of lawyers in their practices, often 
leading to mistakes, conflicts of interest, the representation of unworthy clients, or other 
conduct that can cause serious claims. These issues have always been at the heart of our 
major claims, and they are not confined to particular types or sizes of firms or specific 
practice areas. 
101. DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, THE LAW FIRM LIABILITY TERRAIN: PUBLICLY REPORTED 
SETTLEMENTS AND VERDICTS (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
tips/webinars/LawFirmLiabilityTerrainRichmond.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN97-XMZ5]. 
102. Id. at 1. 
103. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Broker 8 (Sept. 25, 2013) (“These sorts of debacles are 
hard to keep quiet.”). 
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Richmond reports the following breakdown among these very large claims: 
 Forty-one attributable to dishonest clients 
 Eleven attributable to conflicts of interest 
 Three attributable to mistakes 
 Three attributable to a combination of a dishonest client and a 
conflict of interest 
 Two attributable to malicious prosecution 
 One attributable to a mistake coupled with a conflict of interest 
 One attributable to a dishonest client and a mistake in an extended 
representation of a client 
 One attributable to a firm’s dishonesty (Milberg LLP’s payment of 
secret fees to class action plaintiffs) 
 One attributable to a lawyer’s dishonesty (the O’Quinn Law Firm’s 
settlement of allegations that it over-charged clients for expenses in 
a breast implant class action)104 
In our judgment, Richmond’s “dishonest client” category likely matches up 
reasonably well to ALAS’s “poor client quality” category, with the recognition that 
“dishonest client” appears to be a deliberately provocative label for a category that 
likely also includes honest clients in financial trouble. 
Richmond also tracks settlements and verdicts in the $3 to $20 million range, 
“with the $3 million floor being significant because it exceeds all but the very 
largest law firms’ self-insured retentions.”105 Perhaps because of the smaller size 
of the cases, there is less publicly available information about them (though 
certainly there is much nonpublic information available to Aon in light of its very 
substantial role in the LPL market). Richmond reports that such cases are 
“numerous,” and categorizes an unspecified set of “recent cases” of this size as 
follows: 
 Thirty-three attributable to mistakes 
 Seventeen attributable to dishonest clients 
 Thirteen attributable to conflicts of interest 
 Three attributable to malicious prosecution 
 One attributable to fraud106 
He reports that “the $3-20 million claims are believed to be representative of 
matters within the range” even though “they are not all-inclusive.”107 
Commenting on these cases, he observes: 
What is perhaps most interesting about the settlements and verdicts in 
the $3-20 million range is the prevalence of mistakes as the cause of loss, 
which distinguishes cases of this size from those exceeding $20 million. 
There probably are two reasons for this. First, the cases in the $3-20 
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million range include a number of matters involving small law firms. 
Because lawyers in small firms often do not work in teams in the same 
way that their counterparts at large law firms do, there is a greater 
likelihood that mistakes will escape notice until they allegedly harm 
clients. Lawyers working in teams in large law firms tend to catch 
mistakes before work gets out the door. Second, dishonest client claims 
and conflict of interest allegations often put “heat” in cases, thus driving 
up settlement and verdict value, while simple negligence rarely is an 
aggravating factor. Thus, it is logical that most of the largest settlements 
and verdicts would be rooted in allegations of dishonesty and conflicts of 
interest.108 
CONCLUSION 
This review of the available quantitative data on the past thirty years of 
experience in lawyers’ professional liability shows a pattern of relative stability and, 
if the ALAS experience can be generalized, a decline in the real cost of lawyers’ 
liability on a per lawyer basis. As discussed above, there are reasons to doubt the 
generalizability of the data. Both the ABA Standing Committee study and the 
ALAS data are a convenience sample that may not be representative of insured 
lawyers, let alone lawyers more generally. Nonetheless, these are the best data 
publicly available. 
Unlike medical liability, researchers studying legal professional liability do not 
have other significant publicly available data. In the medical liability context, 
researchers have (1) the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), tracking all 
payments made by or on behalf of physicians in the United States;109 (2) The 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) financial database, 
which reports medical liability losses separately;110 and (3) closed-claim records of 
medical liability in individual states like Texas, Florida, Missouri, and Illinois.111 
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To be sure, each of these sources is flawed in its own right. For example, 
there are serious concerns that the exclusion of claims made by or on behalf of 
hospitals and other institutional medical providers means that the NPDB does not 
include all claims.112 Further, there are serious concerns that the NAIC data 
under-count medical liability losses because of the large number of alternative risk 
transfer mechanisms, especially for hospitals and other large collections of medical 
providers.113 And, there are concerns about the generalizability of conclusions 
based upon a single state.114 But, especially when considered together, these 
sources provide a significant window into medical liability. With these data in 
hand researchers can make estimates and reach judgments about the overall 
population of medical liability claims that simply cannot be made about lawyers’ 
liability. 
Perhaps it is impossible to hope for such data in the LPL context. The 
NAIC data on medical liability, for example, is a reasonable sample because 
physicians have legal and other institutional requirements that obligate them in 
most cases to be insured,115 a situation that we know does not correspond to 
lawyers, especially those in solo- and very small-firm practice. More importantly, 
there is likely little political will to create closed-claims records in the LPL context. 
All of the public sources of medical liability data are a side effect of the political 
struggle on the part of the medical profession to escape from medical liability. As 
part of this struggle, advocates for the medical profession made assertions about 
the extent and cost of medical liability in relation to the underlying rate of medical 
malpractice that researchers acting on behalf of the profession attempted to back 
up through empirical research.116 The political struggle took the medical 
profession into legislatures, where advocates asked for relief from the usual tort 
law rules that governed all of the other professions. In that process, the 
legislatures passed laws that required medical liability insurers and others to 
provide data to the government about medical liability losses.117 
That political struggle never took place for the legal profession. Perhaps 
because the legal profession regards lawyers’ liability as just one more form of self-
regulation by the profession, the organized bar has never mounted the kind of 
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challenge to lawyers’ liability that the medical profession mounted to challenge 
medical liability. Thus, there have been no legislative demands for legal liability 
reform that have led the way to the kind of mandatory reporting that exists for 
medical liability. 
This makes the quantitative study of legal malpractice difficult, at best. There 
is little we can say conclusively from the data even about how many claims are 
brought and settled, let alone the merits of the claims and the impact of the claims 
on the practice of law. This means that, even more so than for medical liability, 
understanding the nature and extent of lawyers’ liability requires going out into the 
field. 
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